📍New Delhi | 8 Dec, 2025, 7:25 PM
9 JAT Battle of Chhamb: 9 JAT was mobilised in September 1971 as part of 68 Infantry Brigade, moving from Khrew in Jammu & Kashmir to the Akhnoor sector. The battalion was earmarked to participate in the planned offensive of 10 Infantry Division against Pakistan. The unit concentrated in the general area of Akhnoor for coordination and intensive training. All commanders, down to platoon level, were tasked to carry out reconnaissance of Pakistani Border Outposts such as Bokan and Dalla, almost 30 kilometres inside enemy territory from Chhamb, wearing BSF uniforms to avoid detection. The battalion also undertook extensive infantry–tank cooperation training at Jaurian with 9 Deccan Horse. By the end of this preparation, 9 JAT stood fully ready as part of the Corps Reserve to avenge the loss of Chhamb suffered in 1965.
Shift from Offensive to Defensive After Pakistan’s Airstrikes
However, the situation changed dramatically on 3 December 1971 when Pakistan launched pre-emptive airstrikes on Indian airbases. The 10 Infantry Division’s operational posture had to shift instantly from offensive to defensive, even though formations were still positioned in their original areas. 9 JAT was ordered to move urgently to the Pallanwala sector to occupy defences on the eastern bank of the River Manawar Tawi. No one from the unit had seen this area before, but the battalion moved without hesitation, finding its own routes and organising defences as required.
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Challenging March Toward Pallanwala Under Enemy Shelling
On 4 December, while 9 JAT advanced on foot along the Akhnoor–Pallanwala axis towards its new defensive positions, it encountered troops of 191 Infantry Brigade withdrawing rapidly after being forced to abandon their defences across the Manawar Tawi within just three days. The sight of withdrawing troops, pursued closely by the advancing enemy, could easily have shaken the morale of the fresh 9 JAT soldiers moving up to take their place. To make matters worse, a few Pakistani artillery Observation Posts infiltrated along with the withdrawing troops and began directing accurate artillery fire on the advancing 9 JAT columns.
Taking Up Defences in Completely Unfamiliar Terrain
Despite these challenges, the battalion reached Pallanwala in excellent shape and high spirits. With intense enemy shelling and no prepared defences, the Battalion Headquarters occupied bathing cubicles near a village well outside a local school. Company commanders were briefed quickly about their areas of responsibility on the eastern bank of the river, a completely unfamiliar terrain for the unit.
Hastily Prepared Positions Without Armour or Artillery Support
The companies hurriedly occupied defensive positions along the riverbank. The area was covered with ten-foot-high sarkanda grass and dotted with marshy patches. For administrative practicality, platoon localities were placed around fifty metres behind the riverline, even though this meant limited observation and weak fields of fire. There were no mines or defensive stores, and the defences had to be prepared hastily within four to five days. The battalion did not have tank support or even artillery OPs. It was responsible for guarding the Raipur and Darh crossings-both considered the most likely routes for enemy armour-without any external support.
Having shifted recently from Modified ‘M’ to Modified ‘P’ scale, the battalion had managed to collect only six recoilless guns from Mumbai, and there had been no opportunity for proper conversion training for the detachments before deployment on the Manawar Tawi defences.
Pakistani Assault Begins at Raipur and Darh Crossings
The anticipated Pakistani assault came at 0100 hours on 10 December, launched by 111 Brigade of 23 Pakistani Infantry Division, supported by 28 Cavalry. The enemy struck opposite the Raipur and Darh crossings, targeting the two forward companies of 9 JAT as well as the depth company. The Pakistani armour overran these companies in the opening phase of the assault.
A Fierce Infantry-Versus-Tank Battle in the Dark
In the absence of Indian armour support, the engagement turned into a pure infantry-versus-tank battle. Some 9 JAT jawans attempted to climb onto the attacking tanks, while others engaged them with their SLR rifles, fighting to the last. Yet the soldiers of 9 JAT held their trenches and refused to abandon their positions.
Heavy Casualties but Unbroken Courage of 9 JAT
The infantry assault that followed was repulsed despite the battalion’s severe defensive disadvantages. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. But 9 JAT also suffered grievous losses: three officers, three JCOs, and seventy-six ORs were killed, with an equal number wounded. By the next day, the battalion had lost two rifle companies completely, including their company commanders.
Holding the Line and Enabling the Division’s Counterattack
Even with such heavy losses, 9 JAT held its ground. The battered companies maintained their positions, forming the critical firm base that later enabled the 10 Infantry Division’s counterattack to retake lost ground.
Enemy Withdrawal After Leadership Loss and Boggy Terrain
A stroke of fortune favoured the battalion: the boggy terrain around the Darh and Raipur crossings restricted the movement of Pakistani tanks, preventing them from exploiting their gains. Additionally, the GOC of the attacking 23 Infantry Division was killed in a helicopter crash on 10 December, leading to confusion and a slowdown in the enemy advance. The Pakistani forces eventually withdrew west of the river before the Indian counterattack.
Unrecognised Bravery Despite Turning the Tide of Battle
Although the enemy enjoyed numerical superiority and geographical advantage, they failed to break the 9 JAT defences. Repeated attacks were repelled by the steadfast courage of the battalion. It was the leadership, determination, and exceptional valour of the officers and men that stopped multiple waves of enemy assaults and ensured the unit held its ground in honour of its regiment, its comrades, and the nation.
Unfortunately, this exceptional courage did not receive due recognition. Since 9 JAT was part of the Corps Reserve, and because the formation faced overall setbacks-including the loss of Chhamb for the second time-its role was overlooked.
9 JAT’s Annual Tribute to Its Martyrs of Chhamb 1971
Every year on 10 December, 9 JAT pays homage to its martyrs of the Battle of Chhamb. The unit continues its effort to secure rightful recognition for its decisive role in halting the enemy’s advance towards Akhnoor at a tremendous cost.
(Author Brig RA Singh, VSM (Retd) served as the Adjutant of 9 JAT during the Battle of Chhamb, 1971.)
Discover the untold story of courage in the 1971 Battle of Chhamb. Read the full account here.
